Abstract. We describe a framework for constructing an efficient non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol for n parties for any n ≥ 2. Our approach is based on the problem of computing isogenies between isogenous elliptic curves, which is believed to be difficult. We do not obtain a working protocol because of a missing step that is currently an open mathematical problem. What we need to complete our protocol is an efficient algorithm that takes as input an abelian variety presented as a product of isogenous elliptic curves, and outputs an isomorphism invariant of the abelian variety.
Introduction
Let F q be a finite field, let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over F q , and let X be the set of elliptic curves over F q that are isogenous to E. The set X is almost always large (containing on the order of √ q elements). Moreover, under suitable conditions on E, the set X is endowed with a free and transitive action * by a certain abelian group G, which is the ideal class group of the endomorphism ring of E. The action * maps a given g ∈ G and E ∈ X to a curve g * E ∈ X. This action, originally defined by Deuring [Deu41] , has a number of properties that makes it useful in cryptography. First, for a fixed curve E ∈ X, the map G → X defined by g → g * E is believed to be a one-way function. In other words, given a random curve E ′ ∈ X it is difficult to find an element g ∈ G such that E ′ = g * E. This suggests a DiffieHellman two-party key exchange protocol, proposed by Couveignes [Cou06] and Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [RS06]: Alice chooses a random a ∈ G and publishes E a := a * E; Bob chooses a random b ∈ G and publishes E b := b * E. Their shared key is the curve E ab := (ab) * E = a * E b = b * E a , which they can both compute. To ensure that both parties obtain the same key, their shared key is the j-invariant of the curve E ab . More recently, De Feo, Jao, and Plût [FJP14] , Galbraith [Gal18] , Castryck et al. [CLM + 18] , and De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith [FKS18] proposed variants of this protocol with better security and efficiency. Moreover, a supersingular version of the isogeny problem was introduced and proposed as the basis for a collision resistant hash function [CLG09] . Security of this one-way function was further studied in [EHL + 18] .
Second, as alluded to above, the star operator satisfies the following useful property: for all g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G the abelian varieties A 1 := (g 1 * E) × · · · × (g n * E) and A 2 := (g 1 · · · g n ) * E × E n−1 are isomorphic (see Appendix A.4). As we will see in the next section, this suggests an n-party non-interactive key exchange protocol, as well as many other cryptographic constructions. This property leads to a more general cryptographic primitive that we call a cryptographic invariant map, defined in the next section. This primitive has properties that are similar to those of cryptographic multilinear maps [BS03, GGH13a] , which have found numerous applications in cryptography (e.g, [GGH + 13b, GGSW13, BW13, BLR + 15]). We discuss applications of cryptographic invariant maps in Section 3. In Remark 4.4 we explain why we use ordinary and not supersingular elliptic curves. Section 4 describes our approach to constructing cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies.
This work leads to the following question in algebraic geometry.
An open problem. To make the cryptographic applications discussed above viable we must first overcome an important technical challenge. While the varieties A 1 and A 2 defined above are isomorphic, they are presented differently. Our applications require an efficient way to compute an invariant that is the same for A 1 and A 2 . In addition, the invariant must distinguish non-isomorphic varieties. We do not know any such computable isomorphism invariant, and we present this as an open problem. In Section 5 we explain why some natural proposals for isomorphism invariants do not seem to work. In Remarks 2.4 and 4.2 we show that a solution to this open problem, even for n = 2, would solve the isogeny decision Diffie-Hellman problem. Further, we give evidence that computing a particular isomorphism invariant might be equivalent to solving the elliptic curve isogeny problem, which is believed (or hoped) to be a quantum-resistant hard problem. Thus, Section 5 might be useful from the point of view of cryptanalysis of isogeny-based cryptography.
Cryptographic invariant maps
Definition 2.1. Let X be a finite set and let G be a finite abelian group. We say that G acts efficiently on X freely and transitively if there is an efficiently computable map * : G × X → X such that:
• the map is a group action: g * (h * x) = (gh) * x, and there is an identity element id ∈ G such that id * x = x, for all x ∈ X and all g, h ∈ G; • the action is transitive: for every (x, y) ∈ X × X there is a g ∈ G such that g * x = y; and • the action is free: if x ∈ X and g, h ∈ G satisfy g * x = h * x, then g = h.
Definition 2.2. By a cryptographic invariant map we mean a randomized algorithm MapGen that inputs a security parameter λ, outputs public parameters pp = (X, S, G, e), and runs in time polynomial in λ, where:
• X and S are sets, and X is finite, • G is a finite abelian group that acts efficiently on X freely and transitively, • e is a deterministic algorithm that runs in time polynomial in λ and n, such that for each n > 0, algorithm e takes λ as input and computes a map e n : X n → S that satisfies: -Invariance property of e n : for all x ∈ X and g 1 , . . . , g n ∈ G,
-Non-degeneracy of e n : for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ∈ X, the map X → S defined by y → e n (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y, x i+1 , . . . , x n ) is injective.
In our candidate instantiation for cryptographic invariant maps the set X is a set of isogenous elliptic curves and the group G acting on X is a class group. The elements of S are isomorphism invariants of products of elliptic curves.
Definition 2.2 is quite ambitious in that it asks that e n be defined for all n > 0 and run in polynomial time in n (and λ). A cryptographic invariant map that is defined even for a single n > 2, and satisfies the security assumptions in the next subsection, would still be quite interesting. We require a construction that works for all n because our framework using elliptic curve isogenies seems to support it. Similarly, we note that a construction that works for all n > 0, but runs in time exponential in n is still useful. It would limit our ability to evaluate e n to relatively small n, but that is still of great interest. In the first three proposals in Section 5 we study candidates for e n that run in time exponential in n, satisfy the nondegeneracy property, but do not satisfy the invariance property. It is an open problem to find a map that also satisfies the invariance property.
Security assumptions. Next, we define some security assumptions on cryptographic invariant maps. The notation x ← R X will denote an independent uniform random variable x over the set X. Similarly, we use x ′ ← R A(y) to define a random variable x ′ that is the output of a randomized algorithm A on input y.
The n-way computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that, given only the public parameters and (g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x) ∈ X n , it is difficult to compute e n−1 (g 1 · · · g n ) * x, x, . . . , x . A precise definition is the following: Definition 2.3. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (n-CDH) if for every polynomial time algorithm A,
is a negligible function of λ, when pp ← R MapGen(λ), g 1 , . . . , g n ← R G, and x ← R X.
Remark 2.4. The natural n-way decision Diffie-Hellman assumption on X does not hold when invariant maps exist. That is, for all n > 0 it is easy to distinguish (g 1 · · · g n ) * x ∈ X from a random element of X, given only x, g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x. Given a challenge y ∈ X, simply check if e n (y, x, . . . , x) = e n (g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x). Equality holds if and only if y = (g 1 · · · g n ) * x. However, in Definition 2.5 we define an n-way decision Diffie-Hellman assumption for e n−1 . It states that it is hard to distinguish e n−1 (g 1 · · · g n ) * x, x, . . . , x from a random element in the image of e n−1 , given only the public parameters, x, and (g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x) ∈ X n . Definition 2.5. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way decision Diffie-Hellman assumption (n-DDH) if the following two distributions, P 0 and P 1 , are polynomially indistinguishable, when pp ← R MapGen(λ), g 1 , . . . , g n ← R G, and x ← R X: • P 0 is (pp, g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x, s 0 ) where s 0 = e n−1 (g 1 · · · g n ) * x, x, . . . , x , • P 1 is (pp, g 1 * x, . . . , g n * x, s 1 ) where s 1 is random in Im(e n−1 ) ⊆ S.
Applications
We show that suitable cryptographic invariant maps can be used to solve a number of important problems in cryptography.
n-way Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE). We show how to use a cryptographic invariant map to construct a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) protocol in which n parties create a shared secret key that only they can efficiently calculate, without any interaction among the n parties. Currently, secure n-party NIKE for n > 3 is only known from general purpose indistinguishability obfuscation (e.g., [BZ17] ). Our NIKE construction is similar to the one in [Jou04, BS03, GGH13a] and satisfies a "static" notion of security.
• Setup(λ): run (X, S, G, e) ← R MapGen(λ) and choose x ← R X. Output pp := (X, S, G, e, x).
• For i = 1, . . . , n, party i chooses a random g i ← R G, computes x i := g i * x ∈ X, and publishes x i on a public bulletin board.
• The shared key between the n-parties is
Party i ∈ {1, . . . , n} computes k by obtaining x 1 , . . . , x n from the bulletin board, then choosing some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where j = i, and computing k = e n−1 (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 , g i * x j , x j+1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S, where x i is omitted from the input to e n−1 . All n parties obtain the same key k by the invariance property of e n−1 . Static security follows from the n-way decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, as in [BS03] . Alternatively, we can rely on the weaker n-way computational Diffie-Hellman assumption by applying a hash function H : S → K to the key k. We model H as a random oracle in the security analysis. We leave the question of an adaptively-secure NIKE, in the sense of [FHKP13, Rao14] , from an invariant map for future work.
Unique signatures and verifiable random functions (VRF).
A digital signature scheme is made up of three algorithms: a key generation algorithm that outputs a public key and a secret key, a signing algorithm that signs a given message using the secret key, and a verification algorithm that verifies a signature on a given message using the public key. A signature scheme is a unique signature scheme if for every public key and every message, there is at most one signature that will be accepted as a valid signature for that message under the public key. While a number of unique signature schemes are known in the random oracle model (e.g., [BR96, BLS01] [BS03] . The same constructions work with a cryptographic invariant map. The unique signature scheme works as follows: The secret key is a random (g 1,0 , g 1,1 , . . . , g n,0 , g n,1 ) ← R G 2n . The public key is (x, y 1,0 , . . . , y n,1 ) ∈ X 2n+1 where x ← R X and y i,b := g i,b * x for i = 1, . . . , n and b = 0, 1. The signature on an n-bit message m ∈ {0, 1} n is σ := (
To verify a signature σ, check that e n (σ, x, . . . , x) = e n y 1,m 1 , . . . , y n,mn . The security analysis of this construction is the same as in [BS03] .
Constrained PRFs and broadcast encryption. We next describe how to construct constrained pseudorandom functions [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14] for bit-fixing constraints from a cryptographic invariant map. Such constrained PRFs in turn can be used to build broadcast encryption with short ciphertexts [BW13] .
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a function F : K × A → B that is computable in polynomial time. Here, K is the key space, A is the domain, and B is the codomain. Intuitively, PRF security requires that, for a random key k ∈ K, an adversary who obtains pairs a, F (k, a) , for a ∈ A of its choice, cannot distinguish these pairs from pairs a, f (a) where f is a random function A → B.
A bit-fixing constrained PRF is a PRF where a key k ∈ K can be constrained to only evaluate the PRF on a subset of the domain A, where A = {0, 1} n . Specifically, for V ⊆ [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a function v : V → {0, 1}, let A v = {a ∈ A : ∀i ∈ V, a i = v(i)}. A constrained key k v enables one to evaluate F (k, a) for all a ∈ A v , but reveals nothing about F (k, a) for a / ∈ A v . We refer to [BW13] for the complete definition of this concept, and its many applications.
We now explain how to construct bit-fixing constrained PRFs from cryptographic invariant maps. The construction and security proof are essentially the same as in Boneh and Waters [BW13] , but translated to our setting. One complication is that the construction of Boneh and Waters requires a way to operate on invariants in S. We get around this by delaying the evaluation of the invariant to the very last step. We thus obtain the following bit-fixing constrained PRF:
• Setup(λ): run (X, S, G, e) ← R MapGen(λ) and choose x ← R X.
• The PRF is defined as:
Here, a ∈ {0, 1} n specifies a subset product of the set of d i,b 's.
• Constrain(k, v): Let V ⊆ [n] be the support of the function v, and assume V is not empty. The constrained key k v is constructed as follows. Set
and let C i = h i otherwise. Output e n (C 1 , . . . , C n ). Then, by construction,
as required. The security proof for this construction is as in [BW13] . This construction can be further extended to a verifiable random function (VRF) by adapting Fuchsbauer [Fuc14] in a similar fashion.
Witness encryption. Witness encryption, due to Garg et al. [GGSW13] , can be used to construct Identity-Based Encryption, Attribute-Based Encryption, broadcast encryption [Zha16], and secret sharing for NP statements. Witness encryption is a form of encryption where a public key is simply an NP statement, and a secret key is a witness for that statement. More precisely, a witness encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms:
• Enc(x, m) is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input an NP statement x and a message m, and outputs a ciphertext c; • Dec(x, w, c) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a statement x, supposed witness w, and ciphertext c, and attempts to produce the message m. We require that if w is a valid witness for x, then for any message m, if c ← R Enc(x, m), then Dec(x, w, c) outputs m with probability 1.
The basic notion of security for witness encryption is soundness security, which requires that if x is false, then Enc(x, m) hides all information about m. A stronger notion called extractable security, due to Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13] , requires, informally, that if one can learn any information about m from Enc(x, m), then it must be the case that one "knows" a witness for x.
We briefly describe how to construct witness encryption from invariant maps. It suffices to give a construction from any NP-complete problem. There are at least two natural constructions from multilinear maps that we can use. One approach is to adapt the original witness encryption scheme of Garg et al. [GGSW13] based on the Exact Cover problem. This approach unfortunately also requires the same graded structure as needed by Boneh and Waters [BW13] . However, we can apply the same ideas as in our constrained PRF construction to get their scheme to work with invariant maps. Another is the scheme of Zhandry [Zha16] based on Subset Sum.
1
As with the constructions of Garg et al. and Zhandry, the security of these constructions can be justified in an idealized attack model for the cryptographic invariant map, allowing only the operations explicitly allowed by the map-namely the group action and the map operation. Justification in idealized models is not a proof, but provides heuristic evidence for security.
Cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies
We begin by recalling some facts that are presented in more detail in Appendix A. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over a finite field F q such that the ring Z[π] generated by its Frobenius endomorphism π is integrally closed. This implies in particular that Z[π] is the full endomorphism ring O of E. Let Cl(O) denote the ideal class group of this ring, and let Ell(O) denote the isogeny class of E. There exists a free and transitive action * of Cl(O) on Ell(O), and there is a way to represent elements of Cl(O) (namely, as products of prime ideals of small norm) that makes this action efficiently computable. Moreover, one can efficiently sample close to uniform elements in Cl(O) under that representation. In addition, the "star operator" * satisfies the following property: for any choice of ideal classes a 1 , . . . , a n , a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n in Cl(O), the abelian varieties
(1) (a 1 * E) × · · · × (a n * E) and (a
1 The basic scheme shown by Zhandry requires an "asymmetric" multilinear map, where the inputs to the map come from different sets. However, he also explains how to instantiate the scheme using symmetric multilinear maps. The symmetric scheme easily translates to use invariant maps.
are isomorphic over F q if and only if
Denote by Ab(E) the set of abelian varieties over F q that are a product of the form (2), and assume that we can efficiently compute an isomorphism invariant for abelian varieties in Ab(E). In other words, assume that we have an efficiently computable map isom : Ab(E) → S to some set S that to any tuple E 1 , . . . , E n of elliptic curves isogenous to E associates an element isom(
if and only if the products E 1 × · · · × E n and E ′ 1 × · · · × E ′ n are isomorphic as abelian varieties. The curves E i are given for example by their j-invariants, and in particular, the ideal classes a i such that E i ∼ = a i * E are not supposed to be known.
Based on such an isomorphism invariant isom, we construct a cryptographic invariant map as follows. The algorithm MapGen(λ) computes a sufficiently large base field F q , and an elliptic curve E over F q such that the ring Z[π] generated by its Frobenius endomorphism is integrally closed (this can be done efficiently: see again Appendix A). The algorithm then outputs the public parameters pp = (X, S, G, e) where:
• X = Ell(O) is the isogeny class of E over F q ;
• S is the codomain of the isomorphism invariant isom;
is the ideal class group of O; and • the map e n : X n → S is given by e n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = isom(E 1 × · · · × E n ). The facts recalled at the beginning of this section show that G acts efficiently on X freely and transitively in the sense of Definition 2.1, and that the properties of Definition 2.2 are satisfied. In particular, the invariance property follows from (2), and the non-degeneracy from the fact that the abelian varieties in (1) are isomorphic only if the corresponding products of ideal classes coincide. Thus, this approach does provide a cryptographic invariant map assuming isom exists.
Remark 4.1. In the 2-party case, the NIKE protocol obtained from this construction coincides with the isogeny key exchange protocols over ordinary curves described by Couveignes [Cou06] and Rostovtsev-Stolbunov [RS06].
Remark 4.2. The existence of isom breaks the isogeny decision Diffie-Hellman problem. Indeed, given three elliptic curves (a * E, b * E, c * E) isogenous to E, one can check whether c = ab in Cl(O) by testing whether the surfaces (a * E) × (b * E) and (c * E) × E are isomorphic. This does not prevent the construction of secure NIKE protocols (as those can be based on the computational isogeny Diffie-Hellman problem by applying a hash function: see Section 3), but currently, no efficient algorithm is known for this isogeny decision DiffieHellman problem.
Remark 4.3. For certain applications, it would be interesting to be able to hash to the set X = Ell(O), i.e., construct a random-looking curve E ′ in the isogeny class of E without knowing an isogeny walk from E to E ′ . An equivalent problem is to construct a randomlooking elliptic curve with exactly #E(F q ) points over F q . This seems difficult, however; the normal way of doing so involves the CM method, which is not efficient when the discriminant is large.
Remark 4.4. One can ask whether this construction extends to the supersingular case. Over F p 2 with p prime, the answer is clearly no, as the isogeny class of a supersingular elliptic curve is not endowed with a natural free and transitive group action by an abelian group. More importantly, isomorphism classes of products of isogenous supersingular elliptic curves over F q are essentially trivial at least in a geometric sense. Indeed, according to a result of Deligne (see [Shi78, Theorem 3.5]), if E 1 , . . . , E n , E ′ 1 , . . . , E ′ n are all isogenous to a supersingular elliptic curve E, then
n over F q as soon as n ≥ 2. In fact, the result holds over any extension of the base field over which all the endomorphisms of E are defined, so already over F p 2 . However, for a supersingular elliptic curve E over a prime field F p , the number of F p -isomorphism classes of products E 1 × · · · × E n with all E i isogenous to E can be large. For example, this is shown when n = 2 in [XYY16, Section 5]. Therefore, one could conceivably obtain a "commutative supersingular" version of the construction above, which would generalize the recent 2-party key exchange protocol CSIDH [CLM + 18], assuming that F p -isomorphism invariants can be computed in that setting. Since those invariants must be arithmetic rather than geometric in nature, however, this seems even more difficult to achieve than in the ordinary case.
Some natural candidate cryptographic invariant maps
In order to instantiate a cryptosystem based on the ideas in this paper, it remains to find an efficiently computable map isom : Ab(E) → S for some set S, as in the previous section. Below we give evidence that several natural candidates fail, either because efficiently computing them would break the cryptographic security, or because they are not in fact isomorphism invariants.
Our primary roadblock is that while E 1 × · · · × E n and E ′ 1 × · · · × E ′ n can be isomorphic as unpolarized abelian varieties, they are not necessarily isomorphic as polarized abelian varieties with their product polarizations. The first three proposals below for invariants are invariants of the isomorphism class as polarized abelian varieties, but are not invariants of the isomorphism class as unpolarized abelian varieties. We do not know a way for the different parties to choose polarizations on their product varieties in a compatible way, to produce the same invariant, without solving the elliptic curve isogeny problem.
At present, we do not know an invariant of abelian varieties in dimension ≥ 2 that does not require choosing a polarization, with the exception of what we call the "Deligne invariant", described below.
The theta null invariant. One natural candidate is given by Mumford's theta nulls, presented in detail in Appendix B. Unfortunately, in order to compute even a single theta null, one must first choose a principal polarization, and the resulting invariant does depend on this choice of polarization in a crucial way. In Proposition B.7 below we show that, as a result, the theta nulls do not in fact provide an isomorphism invariant as unpolarized abelian varieties.
Igusa invariants. Suppose n = 2 and End E ⊗ Q ∼ = Q( √ −d) with d ∈ N square-free. If d = 1, 3, 7, 15, then for E 1 and E 2 in the isogeny class of E, the product E 1 × E 2 is the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve C (see [HN65] ). It is possible to compute such a genus 2 curve C, given a suitable principal polarization on E 1 × E 2 . For each such C, one could then compute the Igusa invariants [Igu60] of C. The number of genus 2 curves C such that E 1 × E 2 is isomorphic to the Jacobian variety of C is large ( [Hay65] and [Lan06, Theorem 5.1]), and unfortunately the Igusa invariants are different for different choices of C. There are many principal polarizations on each element of Ab(E), and no compatible way for the different parties to choose the same one.
Invariants of Kummer surfaces. When n = 2, another approach is to consider the Kummer surface of A = E 1 × E 2 , which is the quotient K = A/{±1}. The surface K itself does not depend on a polarization. But extracting an invariant from K, for example as in [CF96,  Chapter 3], does depend on having a projective embedding of K.
Deligne invariant.
that respects the action of F . A natural candidate for a cryptographic invariant map is the map that sends (E 1 , . . . , E n ) to the isomorphism invariant
Specifying the isomorphism class of T α (E 1 × · · · × E n ) as a Z[F ]-module is equivalent to specifying the action of F as a 2n × 2n integer matrix, unique up to conjugacy over Z. However, we show in Theorem 5.1 below that being able to compute T α (E) for an elliptic curve E in polynomial time would yield a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem of recovering a given E and a * E, and conversely.
Theorem 5.1. An efficient algorithm to compute Deligne invariants T α (E) on an isogeny class of ordinary elliptic curves over a finite field k gives an efficient algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem in that isogeny class. Conversely, an efficient algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem on an isogeny class of ordinary elliptic curves over k yields an efficient algorithm to compute, for some embedding α : W (k) ֒→ C, the Deligne invariants T α (E) on the isogeny class.
Proof. Suppose that E 1 and E 2 are in the isogeny class, and suppose that for i = 1, 2 we have a Z-basis {u i , v i } for T α (E i ) and a 2 × 2 integer matrix giving the action of F with respect to this basis. We will efficiently compute a fractional ideal a such that a * E 1 ∼ = E 2 .
Let f (t) be the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius acting on E 1 or E 2 ; these are the same since E 1 and E 2 are isogenous.
the fractional ideal a i is the image of the map λ i . Suppose M is a positive integer such that M a is an integral ideal of R, and let h = λ
. By [Del69, §7] , the map E → T α (E) is a fully faithful functor, i.e., it induces a bijection
). Thus h arises from a unique isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 . By [Del69, §4] , the kernel of φ is isomorphic as an R-module to T α (E 2 )/h(T α (E 1 )). The latter R-module is isomorphic to R/M a, and hence is exactly annihilated by M a. Thus ker(φ)
Since M a and a are in the same ideal class, we have E 2 ∼ = a * E 1 , as desired. Conversely, suppose we have an algorithm that efficiently solves the isogeny problem in the isogeny class of an ordinary elliptic curve E 0 . Take R as above. We show below that there exists an embedding α : W (k) ֒→ C such that T α (E 0 ) ∼ = R. Given E isogenous to E 0 , use the isogeny problem algorithm to compute a such that E 0 ∼ = a * E. Output T α (E) = a.
It remains to show that an embedding α : W (k) ֒→ C exists such that T α (E 0 ) ∼ = R and T α (E) = a. We follow an argument in the proof of [DT02, Theorem 2.1]. There exists an elliptic curve E ′ over C with CM by R for which H 1 (E ′ , Z) ∼ = R as R-modules. Take any embedding β : W (k) ֒→ C. Then the complex elliptic curve E (β) has CM by R, and by the theory of complex multiplication there exists σ ∈ Gal(C/Q) such that 
Appendix A. Background on isogenies
This appendix provides background on isogenies of ordinary elliptic curves over finite fields and their products, which expands upon the short discussion at the beginning of Section 4 and makes it explicit. Throughout this appendix, E is a fixed ordinary elliptic curve over the finite field F q .
A.1. Endomorphism rings. Let O = End(E) be the endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve E. Note that since, in the ordinary case, all endomorphisms over the algebraic closure are already defined over F q , it is not necessary to distinguish between the endomorphisms of E defined over F q or over F q .
Denote by π ∈ O the Frobenius endomorphism of E, and by O K the integral closure of O, i.e., the ring of integers of End(E) ⊗ Z Q. We have an inclusion of orders Z[π] ⊂ O ⊂ O K and both inclusions are strict in general.
However, the conductor m = O K : Z[π] is typically quite small. Let t be the trace of the Frobenius π (computed using Schoof's algorithm) and D π = t 2 − 4p the discriminant of Z[π]; then m is given by D π = m 2 D where D is the (fundamental) discriminant of O K . Hence, m 2 is the quotient of D π by its squarefree part (or 4 times its squarefree part when D π is even). This is usually a small number, and equal to 1 with constant probability for a randomly chosen curve E.
Therefore, we will assume for simplicity that m = 1, and thus Z[π] = O = O K . Note that strictly speaking, it is not known how to test for that condition in polynomial time (squarefreeness is not known to be easier than factoring), but we can easily test for stronger conditions, such as D π being prime or the product of a large prime by a small squarefree integer, and since restricting attention to such special discriminants is desirable anyway (to avoid smooth class numbers), this is a reasonable test to carry out.
In principle, it should be possible to extend what follows to the general case of an arbitrary endomorphism ring O as long as we restrict attention to, on the one hand, the subset Ell(O) of the isogeny class of E over F q consisting of curves with the same endomorphism ring O as E, and on the other hand, isogenies of degree prime to m. In particular, the latter are guaranteed to preserve the endomorphism ring, and suffice to apply the expander graph argument of Jao-Miller-Venkatesan [JMV09]; see below. There are a few complications in considering the general case, however, so the extension is not considered in the present discussion.
A.2. Classification of abelian varieties isogenous to a power of E. Let Ab(E) denote the category of abelian varieties over F q isogenous 2 to a product of copies of E. In dimension 1, this implies that the set Ell(O) of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over F q isogenous to E is in bijection with the set of isomorphism classes of torsion-free modules of rank 1 over O. Since any such module is isomorphic to an ideal of O, this yields a bijection between Ell(O) and the ideal class group Cl(O) of O.
Under that correspondence, an ideal a maps to the elliptic curve a ⊗ O E given by E/E[a], where E[a] is the intersection of the kernels of all endomorphisms in a (that notation is consistent with the usual one for torsion subgroups). Denote that elliptic curve by a * E. Its endomorphism ring is clearly still O, and the identification is canonical (e.g., because the Frobenius endomorphism on each curve is well-defined). We can therefore consider the elliptic curve b * a * E for some other ideal b of O, and it turns out to be isomorphic to ab * E. Thus, * endows Ell(O) with a group action by Cl(O), under which it is a principal homogenous space. By Steinitz's classification theorem of torsion-free modules of finite type over Dedekind domains [Ste11] (which says that any such module is isomorphic to a sum of ideals, with equality when the product ideals are in the same class) and the equivalence of categories, we see that any abelian variety A ∈ Ab(E) is of the form E 1 × · · · × E g for some elliptic curves E i of the form a i * E. Moreover, two such abelian varieties, if one assumes that the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis holds for quadratic fields (where D = t 2 − 4q can be chosen of the same order of magnitude as q in absolute value). Moreover, the best known algorithms to compute its structure or even its order are subexponential.
We would therefore like to be able to sample uniformly from Cl(O) without having to compute the group structure or the order, and do so in such a way that if the sampling algorithm returns the class of an ideal a, it is feasible to compute a * E (which cannot be done directly with an ideal of large norm, as it involves computing a large degree isogeny).
To solve this problem, the same approach as in the supersingular case basically works: simply obtain an element of the class group as a product of sufficiently many ideals of small prime norm (and the corresponding isogeny as the composition of the corresponding isogenies of small prime degrees). Contrary to the supersingular case, it is not possible to use a fixed degree, but using all small primes up to a polynomial bound is enough, as we will discuss below.
Prime ideals and ℓ-isogenies. Before we discuss the sampling of random classes in Cl(O), we must recall a few facts about the ideals of the quadratic ring O and the corresponding isogenies. All of this is described in particular in [Cou06] , for example. Any ideal a of O can be factored uniquely a = l e 1 1 · · · l er r into a product of powers of prime ideals l i . To any prime ideal l, one can associate the unique rational prime ℓ ∈ Z + above which it sits (ℓ is such that l ∩ Z = ℓZ), and prime ideals can thus be obtained from the ideal decomposition in O of principal ideals generated by rational primes ℓ.
Since O is quadratic, that decomposition is easy to describe in terms of the Legendre symbol D ℓ . A rational prime ℓ such that
, ℓO is itself prime. As a result, these prime ideals are trivial in the class group, and not interesting for our purposes. On the other hand, a rational prime ℓ such that D ℓ = 1 is completely split: we have ℓO = l·l for distinct prime ideals l =l of norm ℓ. This case is the most relevant for us; it gives rise to ℓ-isogenies.
Finally, there are finitely many rational primes ℓ such that D ℓ = 0, i.e., primes dividing the discriminant. Those primes are ramified: ℓO = l 2 for some prime ideal of norm ℓ. As a result, a ramified prime l is of order at most 2 in the class group; moreover, it is a consequence of the Chinese remainder theorem that one can always find an ideal a of O coprime to D such that [l] = [a] in Cl(O). Thus, we can always ignore these primes in order to make the presentation more consistent.
It results from the above that any ideal class [a] ∈ Cl(O) can be written as a product [l 1 ] e 1 · · · [l r ] er of powers of classes of prime ideals over split rational primes ℓ i (such that
Computing a * E therefore reduces to computing l * C for an arbitrary prime ideal l over a split rational prime ℓ, and C an arbitrary elliptic curve isogenous to E. This still cannot be done when the norm ℓ is large, but if it is small (say polylog(q)), it can be done efficiently.
Indeed, for such a split ℓ, there are exactly two ℓ-isogenies from C: if we let ℓO = l ·l, these are C → C/C[l] and C → C/C[l]. As usual for low degree isogenies, they can be computed efficiently by evaluating modular polynomials. Moreover, we can easily distinguish between the two by looking at the action of the Frobenius endomorphism π on the ℓ-torsion C[ℓ] (viewed as an F ℓ -vector space of dimension 2).
More precisely, since D ℓ = 1, the characteristic polynomial X 2 − tX + q of the Frobenius π has two distinct roots µ =μ modulo ℓ, and we can then write the ideals l,l as (ℓ, π − µ) and (ℓ, π −μ) respectively (up to reordering). If we view C[ℓ] as an F ℓ -vector space of dimension 2, the two kernels C[l] and C[l] will be vector subspaces given by
respectively, according to their generators above. In other words, these are the eigenspaces of the Frobenius on C[ℓ], and π acts by multiplication by µ on C[l] (resp.μ on C[l]).
Random sampling in Cl(O).
We have just seen that we can efficiently compute l * C for any prime ideal l of O over a split rational prime ℓ = polylog(q). We now argue that those prime ideals are in fact sufficient to sample from a distribution close to the uniform distribution in Cl(O).
This results from a theorem of Jao, Miller and Venkatesan [JMV09, Th. 1.1] essentially saying that the Cayley graph of Cl(O) obtained using the classes of the ideals l associated to all split rational primes ℓ ≤ x with x = log B |D| is an expander graph for any B > 2. Moreover, there is an explicit bound on the spectral gap; namely, if we denote by λ triv ∼ 2x log x the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, then all other eigenvalues λ satisfy
If we take B = 2 + ε, this implies that, for a suitable absolute constant C, a random walk of length
in the graph yields a distribution that is exp(−δ)-statistically close to uniform. Therefore, if we denote by S the set of ideals l associated to all split rational primes ℓ ≤ x as above, and we choose r elements l 1 , . . . , l r in S at random with r as in (3), then the class of the ideal a = l 1 · · · l r is close to uniformly distributed in Cl(O).
We can then compute the elliptic curve a * E as l r * l r−1 * · · · * (l 1 * E) , and its isomorphism class is close to uniformly distributed in the isogeny class Ell(O) of E.
A.4. A low-brow approach to the classification result. In Appendix A.2 above, we recalled results of Serre and Steinitz that are sufficient to establish the following properties, used in the main construction of Section 4. Suppose that E is such that O = Z[π] is integrally closed, and let a 1 , . . . , a n , a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n be ideals of O. Then, the following abelian varieties are isomorphic:
and more generally, we have
As a side note, we now mention that those properties can in part be established using elementary techniques. More precisely, (4) is a consequence of the following elementary result.
Theorem A.1. Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , and K a finiteétale subgroup of E (i.e., the map E → E/K is separable) defined over F q . Suppose that K contains subgroups K i defined over F q , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, whose orders are pairwise coprime, and suppose
Proof. The result is immediate for n = 1. We next prove the result for n = 2 by constructing an explicit isomorphism. Consider the commutative diagram:
where all maps are the natural quotient isogenies. If we denote by m 1 and m 2 the orders of K 1 and K 2 , we have deg ϕ 1 = deg ψ 2 = m 1 and deg ϕ 2 = deg ψ 1 = m 2 . Now choose integers a, b ∈ Z such that am 1 + bm 2 = 1. We define morphisms
by the following matrices:
Then:
Thus, g•f is the identity on E×(E/K), and similarly f •g is the identity on (E/K 1 )×(E/K 2 ). So f and g are mutually inverse isomorphisms, proving the case n = 2. We now proceed by induction. Suppose the desired result holds for some n, and suppose K can be written as K = K 1 + · · · + K n+1 with the K i 's of pairwise coprime order. Let H = K 1 + · · · + K n . The induction hypothesis implies
On the other hand, K = H + K n+1 and the subgroups H and K n+1 have coprime order, so by the n = 2 case above:
Combining (6) and (7) gives:
which completes the induction.
Applying Theorem A.1 to
, we obtain (4) in the special case when the K i 's have pairwise coprime orders, i.e., when the ideals a i have pairwise coprime norms. The general case follows by observing that for any choice of the a i 's, one can find ideals b i with pairwise coprime norms such that b i is in the same ideal class as a i (just let b 1 = a 1 , and construct b i+1 as an ideal in the class of a i+1 coprime to N (a 1 · · · a i ) · O).
As a result, the "if" part of property (5) also follows. Indeed, by (4),
If the ideal classes of a 1 · · · a n and a
However, the converse (the "only if" part of property (5)) is more difficult, and essentially states that for E ′ and E ′′ isogenous to E, if E ′ × E n−1 ∼ = E ′′ × E n−1 then E ′ ∼ = E ′′ . Such a cancellation result does not hold for a supersingular E, so the proof in the ordinary case has to rely on the structure of the endomorphism ring in a crucial way. See [Shi77] for an illuminating discussion, particularly Section 4 for the n = 2 case.
Appendix B. Mumford's invariant
In this appendix we give details of the result on Mumford's theta null invariants that was discussed in Section 5.
B.1. Theta functions.
We review what we need from Mumford's theory of theta functions. Let A be a g-dimensional abelian variety over an algebraically closed field k. In practice, we need only work over a low degree extension of our base field. We will assume A comes equipped with a principal polarization given by an invertible sheaf L 0 ; the choice of such a polarization will later be crucial for our analysis. Let L be an ample symmetric invertible sheaf on A with char(k) ∤ deg L. Going forwards, all sheaves will be of this form. Typically we let L = L m 0 for some m not divisible by char(k). For P ∈ A, write τ P for the translation-by-P map. Let H(L) ⊂ A be the set of P for which τ * P L ∼ = L. For convenience, we will assume H(L) = A[m] for some choice of m. Let G(L) be the theta group of L, which consists of pairs (P, ψ P ) where P ∈ H(L) and ψ P : L → L is an isomorphism that factors through τ * P L; that is, there is some
The group operation is (P, ψ P )(Q, ψ Q ) = (P + Q, ψ P • ψ Q ), which one checks is well-defined. The theta group lies in an exact sequence
where the image of α ∈ k * is (O, α), and the map
. Then G(L) has a natural action on V . Let δ be the g-tuple (m, m, . . . , m); we call δ the level or type of L. Let K 1 = (Z/mZ) g , let K 2 = Hom(K 1 , k * ), and let H(δ) = K 1 × K 2 . Write x, y for the evaluation pairing on H(δ), which we extend to a symplectic form by letting K 1 × {0} and {0} × K 2 be isotropic subspaces. Let G(δ), the abstract theta group of level δ, be the set k * × H(δ) with group operation (a, x, y)
Then G(δ) lies in the exact sequence
Let V (δ) be the k-vector space of maps from
A level δ theta structure for A is a choice of L as above as well as a choice of isomorphism
that is the identity on k * . Mumford [Mum66, p. 298] shows that α induces an isomorphism β : V (δ) → V , unique up to a scalar, that respects α. That is, for all g ∈ G(δ) and f ∈ V (δ), we have β(gf ) = α(g)β(f ). Let x 0 , . . . , x N be a fixed ordering of the elements of K 1 , and let f i be the delta function at x i ; that is, f i (x i ) = 1 and f i (x j ) = 0 for i = j. The f i then furnish a canonical basis for V (δ). Let As a consequence, we see that the theta null associated to a theta structure of type δ, with 4 | δ, is a nondegenerate invariant; that is, with δ chosen beforehand, nonisomorphic abelian varieties cannot have the same theta null. Proof. Let x 1 , . . . , x g , y 1 , . . . , y g be a symplectic basis for H(δ). Let P i = h(x i ) and Q i = h(y i ). We have that G(δ) is generated by k * and the elements (1, x i , 0) and (1, 0, y i ). Each of these elements has order m in G(δ). Let α : G(δ) → G(L) be an isomorphism that induces h. Then α((1, x i , 0)) = (P i , ψ P i ) and α((1, 0, y i )) = (Q i , ψ Q i ) for appropriate choices of ψ P i and ψ Q i ; in particular, each of these maps V → V must have order dividing m. From the exact sequence (8), we see that for fixed i, any two choices of ψ P i (resp. ψ Q i ) differ by a nonzero scalar. But such a scalar must be an mth root of unity so that ψ P i (resp. ψ Q i ) has order m. Thus, for each P i , there are at most m choices of ψ P i , and similarly for the Q i . Since the choices of α((1, x i , 0)) and α((1, 0, y i )) completely determine α, the claim follows.
Lemma B.4. Let A 1 , A 2 be abelian varieties and L 1 , L 2 ample invertible sheaves on A 1 , A 2 , respectively. For i = 1, 2 let p i : A 1 × A 2 → A i be the projection maps. Then
Proof. This is Lemma 1 on p. 323 of [Mum66].
We will write the right-hand group above as G(
; if we think of the relevant groups as group schemes, then we do in fact get the fiber product.
Observe that if δ 1 , δ 2 are the types of L 1 , L 2 , respectively, then δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 ) is the type of
. It follows that if α i is a theta structure for the pair (A i , L i ), then we have a product theta structure α :
Proposition B.5. Let A 1 and A 2 be abelian varieties, let L 1 and L 2 be ample invertible sheaves on A 1 and A 2 of types δ 1 and δ 2 , respectively, and let L = p * 1 L 1 ⊗ p * 2 L 2 , an invertible sheaf on A = A 1 ×A 2 . Let α 1 and α 2 be theta structures for (A 1 , L 1 ) and (A 2 , L 2 ), respectively, and let α be the product theta structure for (A, L). For the theta structure α i , let φ i : A i → P N i be the associated morphism, and similarly define φ : A → P N . Then, up to possible reordering of coordinates, φ = s • (φ 1 , φ 2 ), where (φ 1 , φ 2 ) : A 1 × A 2 → P N 1 × P N 2 and s is the Segre map P N 1 × P N 2 → P N .
Proof. We first check that the Segre map makes sense; that is, that N = (N 1 + 1)(N 2 + 1) − 1.
Setting V i = Γ(A i , L i ) and V = Γ(A, L), we have dim V i = N i + 1, dim V = N + 1, but also V = V 1 ⊗ V 2 . Observe that similarly, V (δ) = V (δ 1 ) ⊗ V (δ 2 ). Therefore the dimension counts are compatible.
By our isomorphisms G(δ) ∼ = G(δ 1 ) × k * G(δ 2 ) and G(L) ∼ = G(L 1 ) × k * G(L 2 ) and the fact that α is obtained as
one sees that the induced isomorphism β : V (δ) → V can instead be written
where the β i are the isomorphisms induced by the α i . Let f 0 , . . . , f N 1 be the standard basis for V (δ 1 ), and g 0 , . . . , g N 2 the standard basis for V (δ 2 ). Then f i ⊗ g j is a basis for V (δ) = V (δ 1 ) ⊗ V (δ 2 ), and one sees that it will be a permutation of the standard basis. Let us assume that the standard ordering is given by f 0 ⊗ g 0 , f 1 ⊗ g 0 , . . . , f 0 ⊗ g 1 , f 1 ⊗ g 1 , . . . .
Let r i = β 1 (f i ) and s j = β 2 (g j ). Then for P = (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 , φ 1 (P 1 ) = [r 0 (P 1 ) : · · · : r N 1 (P 1 )], φ 2 (P 2 ) = [s 0 (P 2 ) : · · · : s N 2 (P 2 )], and φ(P ) = [(r 0 s 0 )(P ) : (r 1 s 0 )(P ) : · · · : (r N 1 s N 2 )(P )] = [r 0 (P 1 )s 0 (P 2 ) : · · · : r N 1 (P 1 )s N 2 (P 2 )].
Then visibly s(φ 1 (P 1 ), φ 2 (P 2 )) = φ(P ). The claim follows.
Observe that under the hypotheses of the proposition, if φ is an embedding, then φ(A) is simply the Segre embedding applied to the product embedding
B.3. Mumford's theta null invariant. Fix n ∈ Z >0 and mutually isogenous elliptic curves E 1 , . . . , E n . Let A = E 1 × E 2 × · · · × E n with its product polarization, i.e., the principal polarization with divisor (9) D = ({O} × E 2 × · · · × E n ) + (E 1 × {O} × E 3 × · · · × E n ) + · · · + (E 1 × · · · × {O}).
Fix m ≥ 2 and let L be the invertible sheaf associated to the divisor mD, so that H(L) = A[m] and δ = (m, m, . . . , m). Loop over every theta structure for L and, for each one, compute the associated theta null. We define Mumf m (E 1 , . . . , E n ) to be the resulting set of theta nulls.
Proposition B.6. For fixed m and n, we have # Mumf m (E 1 , . . . , E n ) ≤ m 2n · #Sp 2n (Z/mZ).
Proof. To choose a theta structure, we first choose a symplectic isomorphism h : H(δ) → H(L). The number of such isomorphisms is the size of Sp 2n (Z/mZ), the group of 2n × 2n symplectic matrices with entries in Z/mZ. For each symplectic isomorphism h, by Lemma B.3 there are m 2n theta structures lying above it. The claim now follows.
Proposition B.7. Let E 1 and E 2 be isogenous ordinary elliptic curves over F q with complex multiplication by Q( √ −d) with d square-free. Let h(d) be the class number of Q( √ −d). Suppose 4 | m ∈ Z >0 and h(d) > m 4 #Sp 2n (Z/mZ). Then there exist E 3 and E 4 isogenous to E 1 such that E 1 × E 2 ∼ = E 3 × E 4 but Mumf m (E 1 , E 2 ) = Mumf m (E 3 , E 4 ).
Proof. Let A = E 1 × E 2 . Let P be the set of pairs of elliptic curves (E 3 , E 4 ) isogenous to E 1 for which A ∼ = E 3 × E 4 . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M := Mumf m (E 1 , E 2 ) = Mumf m (E 3 , E 4 ) for all (E 3 , E 4 ) ∈ P . Construct a map F : P → M as follows. Given (E 3 , E 4 ) ∈ P , define the invertible sheaves L 3 = L(mO) on E 3 , L 4 = L(mO) on E 4 , and L = p * 3 L 3 ⊗ p * 4 L 4 on E 3 × E 4 , where the p i are the obvious projections. Let δ = (m, m). Then our theta nulls for E 3 × E 4 are computed using theta structures of the form α : G(δ) → G(L). Choose a product theta structure α 0 . Then define F (E 3 , E 4 ) to be the theta null associated to α 0 .
We claim that F is injective. For given a theta null in the image of F , it comes from a product theta structure for some (E ′ , E ′′ ) ∈ P . Since 4 | m, by the second part of Proposition B.1 the associated embedding φ(A) is determined by the theta null φ(O). By Proposition B.5, we have φ(A) = s(φ 1 (E ′ ), φ 2 (E ′′ )), where s is the Segre map. As φ is an embedding (by Proposition B.1), the φ i must also be embeddings. Therefore we can recover the pair (E ′ , E ′′ ) from the theta null. This gives a map im(F ) → P which is a left inverse to F , which shows that F is injective.
Let O = End(E 1 ). The map Cl(O) → P given by [a] → (a * E 1 , a −1 * E 2 ) is injective, so #P ≥ h(d). By Proposition B.6 and our assumption on m we have #M ≤ m 4 #Sp 4 (Z/mZ) < h(d) ≤ #P, contradicting the injectivity of F . The claim follows.
